This paper uses the data of A-share listed pharmaceutical manufacturing companies in both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China for the period from 2014 to 2016. The empirical investigation shows that there is a positive correlation between ownership concentration and firm performance, and firm size plays a negative moderator role in the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. There is a positive relationship between equity blockholders and firm performance, in which firm size plays a negative moderator role in the relationship between equity blockholders and firm performance. This also shows that for firms in the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry in China, ownership concentration with equity blockholders, i.e. ownership controlled by only a small number of large shareholders, will improve firm performance. We also conclude, however, firms of large size should be more careful in designing its ownership structure and they are advised to keep balance between ownership concentration and equity blockholders so as to reduce the negative moderator role played by firm size.
Introduction
Based on studying the managing behavior of the corporate executives, corporate management is mainly concerned with process of leading, administrating and directing a company toward attaining the company's objectives by managers after they have been authorized by the company's owners to do so. Diff8erent from the meaning of corporate management, corporate governance focuses on ownership of the company's owners and studies on the proper authorization to professional managers and effective control and monitoring of the managing behavior of managers of the company. Berle and Means(1999) were the first to demonstrate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 1 . Through a series of technical studies, they argued that the separation of ownership and control is an inevitable trend of the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for American firms under market economy. Berle and Means also looked into the principal-agent problems associated with the separation, including the two categories: principal-agent problems between owners and managers;
principal-agent problems among different owners.
The system of ownership by stock is part of the internal governance structure. The internal governance structure of the company is a hierarchical system arrangement. The system ensures the separation of ownership and control, and establishes a principal-agent balancing relationship of the two to achieve optimal firm performance. This governance structure is a notion to attain optimal balance between internal interests and powers.
After 20 years of economic reform in China's market, the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets have made impressive development, and as more policies on ownership structure of listed companies have been introduced, a large number of listed companies have emerged and their firm performance has been kept improving. The encouraging policies, however, are inadequate in coping with capricious market changes. We have to admit that there are still many listed companies with inadequately designed ownership structure in China, and ownership structure reform is not completed. Some companies feature in single large shareholder, while others feature in a large number of dispersed small shareholders. In 2016, the market is not in good condition. Many companies with dispersed small shareholders were acquired and their ownerships were transferred. Even China Vanke Co., Ltd, one of the largest companies in China, was involved in equity disputes because of its dispersed ownership. There will be both opportunities and challenges for 2017. Companies of different sizes should clearly understand the relationship between ownership structure and business performance. Ownership structure is not only the first thing an emerging company should take into account, but also an urgent issue when the company expands and aims at achieving optimal business performance.
show 
Ownership structure, firm size, and firm performance
By surveying firms from three industries on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Wei et al (2005) pointed out that firm performance has a positive effect on firm size 13 . Cong (2008) incorporated firm size as a prerequisite into her empirical analysis and concluded that firm size is an important factor influencing ownership structure and business income and the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance does not always present an inverted U-shaped correlation curve 4 . Using samples from manufacturing industry, Quan (2010) selected firm size and ownership structure as independent variables. His empirical analysis results have shown that larger firms are significantly associated with better firm performance and there is a U-shape relationship between the shares held by the largest shareholder and the growth capability of the firm 11 . He also pointed out that the relationship among the three variables differs for firms in different industries.
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The literature review indicates that different methods produce different results, and studies on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance have not reached consistent conclusions.
Research hypotheses

Impact of ownership concentration on firm performance
According to the theory about the first category of principal-agent issues, on the one hand, when ownership concentration is relatively low, the company is controlled by the top largest shareholders, and monitoring can be realized between equity blockholders and managers, so as to reduce agent costs. Appropriate incentive plan help improve the cooperation between managers and shareholders and significantly reduce the negative effects of information asymmetry. On the other hand, when the ownership concentration is high, the largest shareholder has absolutely dominance in controlling the company, and here comes the solution to the second category of principal-agent issues. First, internally speaking, the absolute control by the largest shareholder can reduce the dispersion of information, saving time costs, improving decision-making efficiency, and preventing managers from any deceptive behavior. In this regard, the absolute control by the largest shareholder can improve firm performance. Thus, we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Firm performance in the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry will be improved as ownership is more concentrated.
Influencing mechanism of large shareholders on firm performance
To addressing the second kind of principal-agent issues, the theory of blockholder holds that moderate governance structure can monitor the professional managers to reduce agent costs and prevent equity blockholders from harming the minority shareholders' interests. Thus:
Hypothesis 2: Firm performance of pharmaceutical manufacturers will be improved by the strengthening of equity blockholders.
Moderator role of firm size
Under the current situation of China's capital market, the impact of ownership structure on firm performance is complicated when considering different firm sizes. Hence, we will consider two situations: the ownership of single large shareholder and the ownership structure of several top largest shareholders. Both Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets are China's 
Research design
Sample selection
Our study is mainly focused on the A-share companies listed on both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We use data of a period from 2014 to 2016 in our regression models. In processing the data of companies in pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, we excluded ST and * ST companies, and removed companies that cannot provide complete financial data or data concerning ownership structure. We finally obtained samples of more than 1,000 companies and about 5,000 observations, and all the data come from databases by Wind Info.
Variable definitions
Explained variable
The explained variable (dependent variable) of our investigation is firm performance. As return on assets (ROA) represents the profitability of each asset, the profitability of the common funds of shareholders and creditors, and even the profitability of a firm's assets, we use ROA to measure firm performance.
Explanatory variables
The explanatory variables (independent variables) we use are two indicators related with ownership structure: ownership concentration (CR1, CR5, and CR10) and large shareholders (Z). To thoroughly investigate the issue, we use three proxies to measure ownership concentration: the proportion of the largest shareholder's holdings (CR1), the proportion of the top five shareholders (CR5), and the proportion of the top 10 shareholders (CR10). The indicator Z is composed of five sub-indicators, which are five ratios. These ratios have a
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common denominator, which is the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder. The other five numerators are the proportion of shares held by the 2nd largest shareholder, the sum of share proportions of the 2nd and 3rd largest shareholders, the sum of share proportions of the 2nd to 4th largest shareholders, the sum of share proportions of 2nd to 5th largest shareholders, and the sum of share proportions of 2nd to 10th largest shareholders. Table 1 lists the sub-indicators and their definitions. We use principal component analysis to find out the contributions made by each sub-indicator, which are shown in Table 1 . Indicators Z21 to Z101 are standardized with STATA 12.0 to maintain their stability, and the principal component analysis results are in Table 2 . Only the eigenvalue of the principal component Comp1 are greater than 1, and its contribution to variance is more than 90%. Hence, sub-indicators from Z21 to Z101 has a strong correlation and they can be used to find Z. We also use STATA 12.0 to find the weights of sub-indicators and the results are shown in Table 3 . The weighted coefficients of the indicators from Z21 to Z101 are around 0.4, indicating that all the sub-indicators make very strong contribution to Comp1. We then use KMO test to determine the number of sub-indicators and the results are shown in Table 4 . Table 4 shows that the KMO value of Z21 is 0. 
Moderator variable and control variables
We selected firm size (SIZE) as moderator variable. Many researchers choose the Standard of Small and Medium-sized Industrial Enterprises as reference and use the number of firm employees, sales, or total assets as quantitative indicators of firm size. Considering the availability and the reliability of information disclosure, we use the logarithm of the total assets of listed companies as a measure of firm size.
The control variables in this paper are type of industry and debt-to-asset ratio (DTAR). The industry we have selected is pharmaceutical manufacturing because China's pharmaceutical manufacturing industry is well regulated and, as many companies are restructured stateowned enterprises, their ownership structures are more representative and more in line with national conditions. In addition, because of the highly correlated relationship between capital structure and firm performance, we select debt-to-asset ratio (DTAR) as control variable. The variables are defined in Table 5 . 
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Regression analysis
Descriptive analysis
The descriptive statistical analysis results of the data with STATA 12.0 are shown in Table 6 , which indicates that the gap between firm performances (ROA) is large. respectively, and the mean value is too small. There are also large gaps in firm size and debt to asset ratio. 
Correlation analysis
We use STATA 12.0 for correlation analysis, and the correlation between variables is shown in Table 7 . Table 7 indicates that ownership concentration is positively correlated with firm performance.
The correlation coefficients of CR1, CR5 and CR10 are 0.109, 0.194 and 0.207 respectively.
Index Z is negatively correlated with firm performance. It shows that the relationship between large shareholders and firm performance contradicts Hypothesis 2. As the correlation analysis only concerns the correlation of variables in pair, the specific relationship need to be further tested in the model. and CR10) and firm performance. As the firm expands, the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance will be weakened. This conclusion verifies Hypothesis 3.
Regression analysis
As shown in Table 8 
Robustness test
To test the robustness of the models, we substitute ROE for ROA to measure the independent variable, firm performance, and keeping the explained variable and other explanatory variables unchanged. The regression analysis results are in Table 9 : As can be seen from Table 9 , all the hypotheses have been verified, proving that the models are stable. In addition, by comparing the significance of the indicators, we find that the goodness of fit of firm performance as measured by ROA is better than that as measured by ROE, proving that ROA is a right choice for our analysis.
Conclusions and implications
Conclusions
Based on the data of the pharmaceutical companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares markets, we analyze the relationship among ownership concentration, large shareholders, and firm performance during the period of 2014-2016, and by adding firm size as moderator variable, we also explore the moderator role the firm size plays in the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. The conclusions we have reached are in line with the hypotheses we have proposed in this paper: there is a positive correlation between ownership structure and firm performance, and firm size plays a negative moderator role in this correlation.
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Future investigation
The analysis results have proved a success in our data processing and are consistent with the theoretical results of this paper, but there are still some points that need to be improved: 1) the data only concern with A-share listed pharmaceutical manufacturing companies and their scope is limited; 2) all the models are of multiple linear regression, without taking into account of the possibility of U-shape relationship; 3) only two kinds of variables are taken into consideration for the reason of data availability; 4) the substitution of ROE with ROA to measure firm performance makes the conclusion a little less convincing. These limitations of this paper, however, will provide many future investigation opportunities for interested researchers.
